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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Appellants were charged by in-
formation with the crimes of robbery and 
rape in violation of Sections 76-51-1 
and 76-53-15, Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
as amended. Upon pleas of not guilty a 
jury trial was held and Appellants were 
each found guilty of rape and robbery and 
committed to the Utah State Prison for 
ten years to life (R 69, 70). Defendants-
1 Appellants now appeal from the verdicts 
and judgments entered. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellants seek reversal of the 
convictions and judgments of the Lower 
Court and ask that the cases be remanded 
for a new trial. 
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STATE 
vs. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
OF UTAH, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) Case 
) 9986 
) 9987 
JESSE BAUTISTA and ) 
JOHN FRANCIS BAUTISTA, ) 
) 
Defendants-Appellants.l 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Nos. 
and 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
These are appeals from convictions 
of rape and robbery and sentences to the 
Utah State prison on each count for each 
Defendant. The case was tried to a jury 
with the Honorable John F. Wahlquist 
presiding. 
-1-
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The prosecutrix is a 19-year old 
Weber College student (R 114). She tes-
tified that on the night of February 10, 
1972, she attended an exchange party be-
tween her sorority and a fraternity held 
at the bowling alley in the Studen Union 
Building. She left the social at 11 p.m., 
in her Peugeot Sports car and drove South 
along Harrison Boulevard, turning off on a 
side road near the Wilshire Theatre. She 
stated the occupants of an old, big white 
car behind her began honking its horn as 
if they wanted to talk to her. (R 118, 
119) They drove alongside as if to pass. 
She stated she pulled her car over, 
1 and that Appellants got out of the 
-3-
white automobile and came over to her 
small foreign car. Her reason for stop-
ping is not clear from the record as she 
stated "Well, I can't remember the 
thoughts that were in my mind at that 
time" in response to the prosecutor's 
attempt to lead her into saying she was 
forced off the road. (R 120) Under 
cross-examination, she stated the other 
auto merely pulled up along side her and 
did not pull in front of her. (R 148, 
149, 152) She stated one Appellant got 
into her car from the driver's side and 
the other from the passenger's side. 
"They had a gun and told me to get in the 
middle," she stated, (R 120). No weapon 
was produced at the trial and the prose-
-4-
cutrix described it as follows: "It seems 
1 like it was white on yellow or something, 
I don't know" (R 122). She stated the 
men drove her car to a point near the 
Seven-Eleven store on Washington Boule-
vard and parked it. 
The occupants were joined by a 
third man, who had followed them in the 
white car. At this juncture, prosecutrix 
got into the white car and a white hat 
was allegedly placed over her head so as 
to obstruct her vision. (R 123) 
As the four drove around in the white 
car, one of the men seated next to her is 
said to have asked if she had any money in 
her purse. She said she told him that he 
could have her money - that "he could have 
-5-
anything, but please just let me go and 
don't hurt me". (R 124, 125) 
Subsequently, they stopped to buy 
gas for the car, and later they stopped 
again to buy some beer. (R 125, 126) 
At no time did she attempt to sound an 
alarm or make an escape. (R 173-74) 
They continued driving for twenty or thirty 
minutes and the men began drinking some of 
the beer. Prosecutr ix told them "they 
shouldn't drink it while he was driving;
1 
(R 127) and they then turned off onto a 
dirt road and drove for another ten or 
fifteen minutes. The prosecutrix had no 
idea of where they were. (R 129) 
She testified that after the auto-
mobile was parked one Appellant began 
-6-
unzipping her coat, she stated, "and he 
kind of hit me" (R 130) 'on the face or 
chest or somewhere," removed her lower 
articles of clothing (Rl31) and had in-
tercourse with her. (R 132) She later 
remembered that she had removed at least 
some of her own clothing. (R 167) The 
driver then sat in the back seat with 
her, tried to kiss her, but did not have 
intercourse with her at that time. 
(R 132) The second Appellant allegedly 
then had intercourse with her, and was 
followed by the driver who also had in-
tercourse with her. The prosecutrix 
testified that the three then drove her 
back to her car in Ogden. She testified 
about running a police "road block" on 
-7-
the way back (R 135) and that when they 
returned to where her auto was parked, 
two police cars pulled up along side and 
checked the driver's license and took 
him to their car when he couldn't produce 
one. (R 137) After the police left, the 
prosecutrix claims the Appellants returned 
her to her auto, gave her a dollar and 
offered to follow her home. (R 137) 
South Ogden police officers confirmed 
that they had stopped a white 1960 Dodge 
at 2:40 a.m. of the day in question and 
identified one Appellant as being an occu-
pant. Officer Darrell Jones testified that 
he observed a female in the back seat and 
a male and they appeared to be embraced 
most of the time. (R 204) He said he 
-8-
figured it was a boy friend-girl friend 
relationship. (R 206) Another South 
Ogden Police Officer, Louis J. Passey, 
remembered seeing a couple in the back 
seat. He noted that "one was maybe a 
girl friend-boy friend there and it 
looked like embracing in that fashion." 
He did not recall seeing anyone wearing 
a hat. (R 209) 
The prosecutrix testified she 
arrived home between 3 and 4 a.m., and 
was met by her mother and 
"as I walked in the door she 
came. She watched me come in. 
She was waiting for me. She 
heard me come home, the lights 
were on." 
The prosecutrix testified further, 
"I walked into the house and 
-9-
I said something terrible 
had happened to me, but I 
can't tell you because I 
promised." (R 176) 
Her mother then advised her she 
had already called the police and the 
hospitals. Prosecutrix then went to the 
bathroom without further conversation. 
(R 177) Her mother then called the hos-
pital and advised prosecutrix they were 
going to the hospital. Prosecutrix did 
not ask to go. As they prepared to leave, 
a police car drove into the driveway and 
the officer indicated he wanted to ask 
her some questions. (R 178) Prosecutrix 
left for the hospital with her mother 
without saying anything to the police. 
At the hospital, a police sergeant again 
tried to ask her questions but she declined 
-10-
to answer. Later, she was examined by 
a doctor and after the examination her 
Bishop arrived. She was then taken 
into another room and in the presence 
of her mother, the police, the doctor 
and her Bishop she "answered quest ions." 
(R 179, 180) 
Dr. William R. Egnert testified 
that he examined the prosecutrix on the 
morning in question and confirmed that 
i the prosecuting witness had sperm in 
' I 
I 
l 
I 
i 
I 
her vagina and a laceration of the 
hymen one centimeter in length. (R 184) 
He further testified that he found no 
bruises (R 185) or evidence of her hav-
ing been recently struck on the upper 
part of her body, (R 18 8) and that she 
-11-
remained silent during the course of his 
examination. (R 187) He stated that 
prior to the examination he had been told 
prosecutrix "was not willing to say any-
thing about what happened" (R 186) but 
that he had been told she had allegedly 
been "raped" and had been asked to check 
her to see what he could find. (R 187) 
Appellant Jesse Bautista testified 
that he, his brother and a third man had 
encountered the prosecutrix Southbound 
on Washington Boulevard in her auto stopped 
at a red light. He stated they pulled along 
side her auto and his brother hollered and 
whistled and that she waved back. Prose-
cutrix then turned into a lot and then drove 
back on the street and headed North. 
-12-
Appellant stated they turned and followed 
her and that after a block and a half she 
pulled over and they stopped behind her. 
(R 225, 226) He then stated his brother, 
Johnny Bautista, got out and walked up 
to her auto and that after a few minutes 
of conversation prosecutrix got out of 
( her auto and joined them in theirs. 
I Appellant further stated that as 
I 
\ they drove they decided to get some beer 
and that prosecutrix volunteered to pay 
at least a portion of the cost of a six-
pack. (R 227). He stated that prose-
cutrix opposed their drinking while driv-
ing and suggested "we just go off and 
drink some place where you don't have to 
drive and drink and hit somebody." (R 228) 
-13-
They then went to a service station to 
get some gas and use the washroom (R 229) 
and then drove in a Westerly direction 
for about 20 or 30 minutes and stopped. 
Appellant stated that he and the third 
man left the auto with prosecutrix and 
Johnny Bautista seated in the back seat. 
When he returned Johnny approached him 
'
1bragging how he talked her into it." 
(R 231) Appellant stated that he and the 
driver each tried to seduce her but that 
she resisted him saying she was "sore 
down there." He stated that he at no time 
had sexual relations with her. (R 232, 
233) He denied the presence or exhibition 
of any gun (R 334 and denied that any hat 
was ever placed over her eyes. (R 237) 
-14-
Under cross-examination Appellant 
Jesse Bautista further stated that he 
was a student at Weber State College 
until the time of his arrest, that he 
was married but separated from his wife 
(R 238) and that he repairs automobiles 
for a living. 
Appellant John Bautista also tes-
tified. His statements corroborated the 
account given by his brother (R 264-274). 
He acknowledged that he had intercourse 
with the prosecutrix but denied that any 
force was exerted. (R 271, 272) 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISPLAYING 
A CO-DEFENDANT NOT ON TRIAL, TO THE JURY 
•WHILE CHAINED, HANDCUFFED, UNSHAVEN, UN-
GROOMED AND DRESSED IN COMMON JAIL ATTIRE, 
AFTER DEFENDANTS RAISED THE DEFENSE OF 
CONSENT TO RAPE AND ROBBERY CHARGES. 
POINT II 
· THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
( GRANT A MISTRIAL BASED ON THE PROSECUTOR'S 
l(DERISIVE STATEMENTS CONCERNING DEFENDANTS' 
RACIAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND. 
POINT III 
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
I TO EXCUSE PROSPECTIVE JURORS FOR CAUSE. 
POINT IV 
I THAT THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE 
, FOREGOING ASSIGNED ERRORS DEPRIVED THE AP-
PELLANTS OF A FAIR TRIAL. 
-16-
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISPLAYING 
A CO-DEFENDANT NOT ON TRIAL, TO THE JURY 
1mILE CHAINED, HANDCUFFED, UNSHAVEN, UN-
GROOMED Ai\TD DRESSED IN COMMON JAIL ATTIRE, 
AFTER DEFENDANTS RAISED THE DEFENSE OF CON-
SENT TO RAPE AND ROBBERY CHARGES. 
Defendants-Appellants were charged 
with rape and robbery. Both testified rais-
ing the defense of consent and considerable 
evidence of consent was before the Court. A 
third man had also been charged, was await-
ing a separate trial, and was languishing 
in jail. In the middle of the defense case 
the trial Judge abruptly interruped the 
testimony and summoned counsel to the bench 
to advise them that the third Defendant had 
been brought into Court. (R254) 
-17-
The Judge later acknowledged that the 
third Defendant had been introduced to 
the Courtroom while trial was in progress 
"in order to avoid delay" and to "have 
him somewhere available if he is wanted." 
When asked by defense counsel if the 
prosecutor had requested that he be 
brought in, the Judge rep 1 ied "I did this 
myself." (R 283) 
Upon timely objection from defense 
counsel, the Judge stated for the record: 
"The record may show that Batchelor 
has been brought down, and that he is in 
jail clothes and the defense makes a mo-
tion to redress him before they put him 
in the Courtroom. The Court denies this. 
I believe the jury understands that he is 
in jail, and he has got jail clothes on, 
and he has been brought in in irons and 
is handcuffed." (R 254) 
The Court casually observed that the 
-18-
Co-Defendant "looked like an ordinary pri-
soner" (R 285) and allowed him to be iden-
tified as the driver of the vehicle in 
' which Defendants and prosecutrix had pre-
viously testified they were riding (R 290-
91). The Co-Defendant described the 
occurrence and his physical conditions at 
a hearing outside the jury (R 287-88) as 
follows: 
Q. Were you at that time in your 
regular jail attire, jail clothes? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you given an opportunity 
to put on your street clothes? 
A. No, sir; I was not. 
Q. Were you advised as to where 
you were to be taken? 
-19-
A. No, sir. 
Q. Were you brought from the jail 
into the Courtroom directly? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you have an opportunity to 
consult with your legal counsel before 
you were brought here? 
A. No, sir, I did not. 
Q. Did you have an opportunity to 
shave prior to corning here? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. When was the last time you 
1 shaved? 
A. Yesterday. 
Q. Were you given an opportunity 
to comb your hair? 
A. No, sir. 
-20-
Q. When was the last time you 
, combed your hair? 
A. Yesterday. 
Objections to the Co-Defendant be-
ing in the Courtroom for identification 
in his condition were timely and pro-
perly registered by the defense, (R 254 
and 290) renewed in a motion for a mis-
trial. (R 282) 
These appeals present an issue 
\ of first impression before this Court. 
: Defendants contest the propriety of 
the trial Judge's unilateral disruption 
I 
1 
of a tr ia 1 to bring a Co-Defendant -
I 
1 not then on trial - from the jail to 
I 
J be paraded in front of the jury "for 
I identification purposes" while dressed 
I 
) 
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in common jail attire, in handcuffs and 
leg irons, and while unshaven, ungroomed, 
and uninformed as to where and for what 
purpose he was to be taken and used. To 
so exhibit a Defendant to a jury would 
clearly be prejudical error. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has properly observed that 
a Defendant's right to make a presentable 
appearance is intricately related to the 
fairness and openess of the trial he re-
ceives. State v. Carver 94 Idaho 677, 
496 P2d 676 (1972). See also Alexander v. 
State Okla. Crim. 493 P2d 458 
~~~ ~~~-
(1972); Garcia v. Beto 452 F2d 655 (5th 
Cir. 1971) Ephriam v. State Tex. 
Crim. App. 471 S.W. 2d 798 (1971). 
In light of the particular sensitivity 
-22-
of appearance in this case and by a 
parity of reasoning, a compelling ar-
gument is made that a Co-Defendant -
not on trial - must be properly attired 
before being injected into the trial of 
others charged with personal association 
and with the same criminal acts. The 
point could nowhere be more compelling 
than in the trial of a rape case where 
consent is the basis of the defense. 
Clearly, if a man who allegedly was 
their associate makes a slovenly ap-
pearance the defense of consent is vi-
tiated and Defendants were prejudicated. 
The trial Court's refusal to grant De-
fendants timely request that Co-Defen-
dant be made presentable prior to further 
-23-
contact with the jury deprived the Defen-
dant a fair trial. Furthermore, the Court's 
action could accomplish nothing more than 
instillation in the jurors' minds '~hat 
here was a worthless lot". See State v. 
Martinez 7 Utah 2d 387, 326 P2d 102. The 
trial Judge's assertion that the Co-Defen-
dant was introduced to the jury as he was 
"in order to avoid delay"(R 283) is not 
persuasive. No one had asked for him. 
Neither counsel intended to call him and 
both were aware that he was incarcerated 
in the same building and available to them 
in a matter of minutes if they asked for 
him. 
Although the jail clothing, unkempt 
appearance, handcuffs and leg irons may 
-24-
not influence adversely the thinking 
of a seasoned trial Judge, it does not 
follow that jurors are similarly cal-
loused. One need not dwell on the pro-
priety of the Court's motives in taking 
the action complained of inasmuch as 
the prejudicial effect on the jury can 
and should be assumed. 
The introduction of the Co-Defen-
dant as described was an open invitation 
for the jurors to speculate as to many 
issues not before them. Although he was 
not called upon to answer questions, the 
State was able to elicit prejudicial 
testimony from him through his silence 
and his appearance. 
The jurors were encouraged to spe-
-25-
culate that the defense did not choose 
to call the Co-Defendant for fear of what 
he would say, or they could speculate 
that he too was facing a separate trial and 
would choose to say nothing which might 
incriminate him. It is error for a prose-
cution to call a Co-Defendant, knowing that 
he will invoke his privilege against self-
incr imination and it matters not that the 
party calling the witness was the Judge. 
See State v. Smith 446 P2d 571, 581 (1968). 
The jurors could further speculate 
that since Co-Defendant was not on trial 
with Appellants that he had already been 
convicted or more likely entered a plea 
of guilty. From his jail clothes, hand-
cuffs, leg irons and unkempt condition it 
-26-
would be normal to speculate that such 
was the case and that if he was guilty 
the other Defendants were also guilty. 
It is significant that it was the 
Defendant's case which was interrupted 
by the Judge's declaration that Mr. 
Batchelor was available in the Court-
room. Hence, in effect the Judge called 
the Co-Defendant as a witness. His 
appearance testified. So did his silence. 
Both were negative and adverse to Defen-
dants. The trial Judge's action could 
only be indicative of a desire that the 
jury view the Co-Defendant at his worst. 
The jury in turn was left to speculate 
as to why the Judge wanted them to view 
the Co-Defendant. They were forced to 
-27-
give unwarranted attention to the Co-De-
fendant. He was spotlighted to them in 
a totally negative light. They could 
hardly overlook defense's surprise or 
the hurried bench conferences filled with 
whispered emotional conversations between 
defense counsel and the Court. (R 254) 
This Court has repeatedly taken the 
position that a trial Court should not on 
its own motion invite the jury to question 
witnesses. State v. Anderson 108 Utah 
130, 158 P2d 127, 128 29 (1945) State v. 
Martinez 7 Utah 2d 387, 326 P2d 102 103-04 
(1957). In the instant case, jurors were 
not invited to question the witness but 
they were clearly invited to speculate as 
to why the Defense did not question him. 
-28-
He could have already been convicted 
or have pled guilty or there might 
have been differences between the men. 
All add up to one thing, the trial 
Court put Defendants in an unwarranted 
dilemma. We would be naive to assume 
that the jury would not interpret the 
defense's decision not to call the wit-
ness as evidence of their guilt. 
The issue becomes whether the 
!jury in viewing the set of facts as de-
) 
1~loped could have arrived at adverse 
conclusions influencing their verdict. 
If so, the judgment should be reversed. 
1 
It is fundamental to a fair trial that 
1 as many opportunities for speculation 
as possible be removed from the trier 
-29-
of fact. This was clearly not done. For 
additional guidance this Court might turn 
to U.S. Supreme Court's statement that 
"prejudice is presumed from a material 
error absent in affirmative showing to 
the contrary." Crawford v. United States 
212 U.S. 183 (1909) Appellants' submit 
that the conduct complained of is the 
kind of material error to which the United 
States Supreme Court referred. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GRANT A MISTRIAL BASED ON THE PROSECUTOR'S 
DERISIVE STATEMENTS CONCERNING DEFENDANTS' 
RACIAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND. 
The prosecutor argued his closing 
-30-
position by painting a rosy picture 
of the prosecutrix and an unsavory one 
of the Appellants chastising them 
socially and racially. (R 323-35) 
Next, you have to ask yourselves, 
if Jill Bateman is going to en-
gage in sex, illicit sex, why is 
she going to choose these two 
individuals right here? What is 
there about these two people over 
here that is so appealing? Jill 
Bateman, a daughter of a dentist, 
a daughter of a school teacher, 
a student at Weber State College, 
a dental technician by her own 
testimony is a religious girl, a 
virgin, why would she go out with 
this caliber of individuals? She 
belongs to a social sorority. 
From such you can draw the impli-
ca ticn that she wants to meet simi-
lar situated people as her, people 
with her background, people she 
can empathize with, people that 
she feels familiar with, perhaps 
meet somebody that some day can 
support her in the manner in which 
she is accustomed to. Why would 
she go out with a person not of 
-31-
her own race, a person she never 
knows, and a person that allegedly 
flags her down on Washington Boule-
vard? ... And anybody that would 
do that is about as low an indivi-
dual that you will ever come across. 
Clearly, such comments disparaging 
the Appellants and appealing to racial and 
social bias is rank prosecutorial miscon-
duct. Such were not even tolerated in 
Louisiana in 1915. In State v. Washington 
136 La 855, 67 So. 930 (1915) a conviction 
of rape was reversed wherein the district 
attorney referred to prosecutr ix as "a wo-
man having white blood in her veins" and 
saying "Gentlemen do you believe she would 
have had intercourse with this black brute?" 
In the instant case the defense asked 
first for an opportunity to reply to the 
-32-
inflammatory remarks at a bench confer-
ence immediately after the prosecutor 
concluded his diatribe. (R 326) The 
request was denied and the Judge gave 
no precautionary instructions to the 
jurors. Minutes later and after the 
jury had left the Courtroom to deliber-
ate, the defense renewed the objection 
in the form of a motion for a mistrial 
which in part focused upon the prose-
cutor's remarks as being improper and 
prejudicial. (R 327) 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO EXCUSE PROSPECTIVE JURORS FOR CAUSE. 
The jury voir dire was confusing 
1 from the outset. The Court got matters 
started by telling the jury "Now the 
-33-
fact that the two men are on trial is 
merely a matter of convenience." (R 78) 
The Judge went on to say "What the State 
is alleging, occurred. They allege that 
there was a female stuc'.ent at Weber State 
College ... they claim that she was 
taken forcefully from the car and a weapon 
was used to threaten her . . • they claim 
she was taken to a secluded place and there 
she was raped by three individuals 
(R 78, 79)(Emphasis added) 
" 
The jurors added to the problem. A 
Mr. Dykes stated of Defendants "These two 
fellows I have seen before. When I worked 
for Chambers Music when we were working 
in the vending machine business, with juke 
box machines or whatever on 25th Street 
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II area. (R 83) (In fact Defendants were 
new to the City but how do you impeach 
a juror?) 
A Mr. Cherry followed by respond-
ing to the Cotr t 's inquiry as to his 
personal knowledge of the alleged of-
, fens es by saying "No, I have no know-
ledge of this Court case. I have never 
been acquainted with any rape or rob-
bery charge. I have been acquainted 
I with a murder charge." (R 85) (After 
I 
:the trial it was learned that Appeal-
lants were being investigated in a 
T.urder case for which Co-Defendant 
. Batchelor was charged.) 
I 
During the course of the remainder 
of the voir dire sever a 1 instances of 
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juror bias were demonstrated. A Mr. Dee 
volunteered that he had very strong feel-
ings against the crime of rape. In explor-
ing his comment the conversation went as 
follows: 
Mr. Marsh: Do you feel that the 
aversion would have any undue influence 
on you? 
Mr. Dee: Well, I like to think not. 
I am trying to be honest. As far as guilt 
or innocence is concerned, like I say, l 
don't think it would have much bearing, 
but then again it might be subconscious. 
Mr. Marsh: You think the fact that 
a person is charged with a crime is any 
kind of indication of guilt or innocence 
or would this arouse any feeling of animosity 
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in yourself? 
Mr. Dee: Well, I feel that, in due 
process of law and everything if a person 
is arrested and were identified by the 
victim, I feel that there must be some 
sort of significance to that. 
Mr. Marsh: You feel the fact that 
the charge has been made and that the al-
legation has been made is in fact some 
evidence to the guilt or innocence of the 
parties charged? 
:Mr. Dee: Well, I feel they have 
been involved, I don't know about guilt 
or innocence. (Emphasis added) (R 99) 
At another point a Mrs. Wagstaff 
indicated that because of her feelings 
arising out of another rape charge she 
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should not be involved in hearing this 
matter. When asked by the prosecutor "In 
light of your feelings do you think your 
verdict might be swayed even slightly in 
the way that you would veiw this evidence 
that would come out today?" Mrs. Wagstaff 
acknowledged that "It might." The pro-
secutor in open Court asked that Mrs. 
Wagstaff be struck for cause from the 
panel. (R 96) The Court deferred judg-
ment and later defense counsel asked Mrs. 
Wagstaff "You mean that you would not be 
able to listen objectively to the evidence 
as it is submitted to you and make an in-
dependent and objective determination as 
to the gui 1 t or innocence of the accused?" 
To which Mrs. Wagstaff replied: "I am too 
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upset." The Court then inquired: "You 
realize that this is an entirely different 
case?" To which Mrs. Wagstaff replied: 
"Yes, but" (R 97, 98) 
A Mr. Herrera also stated that 
he v.nuld prefer not to sit on the case. 
In the ensuing conversation the prose-
cutor asked '~nd is this a personal feel-
ing or is it because the Defendants are 
of the same origin and background as you?" 
Mr. Herrera then stated "One is for that 
and the other one, I don't think I could 
make a decision. Sometimes I don't even 
k d • • II ma e my own ecisions. The prosecutor 
then a·sked "Do you think that your feel-
ings would affect the verdict?" To which 
Mr. Herrera replied: "Right." The pro-
-39-
secutor in open Court then moved that Mr. 
Herrera be struck for cause. (R 97) Again 
the Court deferred decision on the motion 
to strike the juror. 
After all questions had been asked 
of the prospective jurors the prosecutor 
renewed his motion to excuse Mrs. Wagstaff 
and Mr. Herrera for cause and defense counsel 
acquiesced.The trial Judge sunnnarily denied 
both requests. Defense counsel then chal-
lenged Mr. Dee for cause and after the Court's 
refusal to discharge him defense counsel 
challenged the entire panel of jurors. 
(R 102, 103) 
Clearly the right to a trial byjury 
includes the right to an unbiased and unpre-
judiced jury, and a trial by jury, one or 
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more of whose members is biased or preju-
1 diced, is not a constitutional trial. 
State v. Parnell, 77 Wash. 2d 503, 463 
P.2d 134 (1969); Seattle v. Jackson, 70 
Wash. 2d 733, 425 P.2d 385 (1967). The 
Kansas Supreme Court recently noted that 
an "impartial juror" is one who is free 
from bias. State v. Cole~an, 206 Kan. 
587, 481 P.2d 1008 (1971). These cases 
are instructive in that they provide 
some basic guidelines. Here the question 
presented in juror disqualification because 
of bias in the context of a trial Court's 
abrogation of the right to challenge a 
propective juror for cause. The Nevada 
Supreme Court has ruled that a legislature 
cannot abrogate the right to challenge 
a juror for cause. Frame v. Grisewood, 
81 Nev. 114, 399 P.2d 450 (1965). Should 
a trial court be able to so do then? Ap-
pellants submit that the question must be 
answered in the negative. 
The Appellants further assert that the 
disqualification of the prospective juror 
was evident and manifest as a matter of law. 
The United States Supreme Court has stated 
that "the bias of a prospective juror may be 
actual or implied; that is, it may be bias 
in fact or bias conclusively presumed as a 
matter of law." United States v. Wood, 
299 U.S. 123, 133 (1936). When a juror 
candidly acknowledges that he has strong 
feelings against rape, and goes on to say 
that he feels that the fact that a party 
is charged and identified is evidence of 
involvement, surely fairness requires that 
this venireman be excused for cause. 
In the same vein jurors who admit 
that because of personal reasons their 
emotions might sway their verdict should 
not be retained on a jury. Each are 
disqualified as a matter of law. 
Surely it is error to force counsel 
to needlessly expend valuable peremptory 
challenges on veniremen who exhibit bias. 
POINT V 
THAT THE CUMUI.ATIVE EFFECT OF 
THE FOREGOING ASSIGNED ERRORS DEPRIVED 
THE APPELLANTS OF A FAIR TRIAL. 
Appellants submit that each of 
the foregoing errors assigned presents 
adequate grounds upon which this Court 
i could reverse and order a new trial. 
Should the Court find, however, that no 
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single issue, by itself, necessitates 
reversal, the Court is then urged to "scru-
tinize with care the propriety of all as-
pects of the proceedings." State v. St. 
Clair, 3 Utah 2d 230, 282 P.2d 323 (1955). 
And in so doing: 
(I)f there is a reasonable likeli-
hood that in the absence of such 
errors a different verdict might 
have been rendered, a new trial 
should be granted. Id. at 244. 
It has long been recognized by this 
Court that there may be several errors in 
a trial, and each error may not independently 
be sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a 
reversal, but when each is viewed in con-
junction with the others, the cumulative 
effect will amount to the denial of a fair 
trial. This position was established in 
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State v. Vasquez, 101 Utah 444, 121 P.2d 
903 (1942), and the latter was reaffirmed 
by this Court in State v. St. Clair, 
supra, wherein it was said: 
It is recognized that a combination 
of errors which, when singly con-
sidered might be thought insuffi-
cient to warrant a reversal, might 
in their cumulative effect do so. 
Id. at 243. 
Viewed from another perspective, 
a judgment should be reversed on the ground 
of judicial misconduct although any one 
of several items of misconduct may not 
justify reversal, where their cumulative 
effect is such that in their absence a 
different verdict would not be improbable. 
Delzell v. Dav, 36 Cal. 2d 349, 223 P.2d 
625 (1950) (Cal. Sup. Ct. in bank). 
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Indeed, a Federal Court recently 
concluded that a person's right to a fair 
trial can be violated even without a showing 
of identifiable prejudice, if the totality 
of the circumstances raises a probability 
of prejudice. Glenn v. State, 341 F. Supp. 
1055 (D. Mo. 1972). If the assigned errors 
are not found to be prejudicial singly or 
in the cumulative effect, this Court can 
still find that the totality of the cir-
cumstances raises a probability of preju-
dice due to the emotional nature of a rape 
case. 
As previously noted, the inherently 
emotional nature of prosecutions for rape 
present unusual problems for Courts. This 
is illustrated in the fact that the essence 
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of rape has been said to be not the 
fact of intercourse, but injury and 
outrage to the feelings of a woman by 
means of carnal knowledge effectuated by 
force. State v. McCune, 16 Utah 170, 
51 P. 818 (1898). The impossibility 
of a defense in such a case must also be 
considered. See State v. Horne, 12 Utah 
2d 162, 364 P.2d 109 (1961). Appellants 
submit that the emotion and difficulty 
of defense which accompany rape prose-
cutions require a more strict scrutiny 
of the entire record to ascertain whether 
improprieties when considered as a whole 
were prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
The individual and cumulative effect 
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of the foregoing assigned errors is clearly 
and uncontrovertably prejudicial, reversible 
error. The conduct of this trial falls 
short of standards enunciated by this Court 
and the United States Supreme Court and 
necessitates a new trial. 
Appellants therefore pray that the 
judgments against each Defendant on each 
charge be reversed and Appellants be dis-
charged or in the alternative, that the 
cases be reversed and remanded for new 
trials. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
WILLIAM D. MARSH 
Attorney for Defendants-
Appe llants 
1018 First Security Bank 
Building 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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